

NUCLEAR FORUM

Panel: Reassessing North Korea's Nuclear Threat after the 3rd Nuclear Test (Regency Room)

Date/Time: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 / 12:30-13:45

Talking Points for: Markus Schiller, Schmucker Technologie

- Public debate (Unha-3) focused on missile role, range issues
- Different approach recommended
 - \circ Threat = Intention x Capability
 - o (No intention, no threat; no capability, no threat)
 - o Unique chance: We can now learn a lot about their capabilities!
- Important questions to look into
 - Unha-3 designed as a weapon or a space launcher?
 - Which capabilities were revealed by the launch?
 - What does that mean for past and future capabilities?
 - What does that mean in the political context?
- Knowledge: 1st stage good, 2nd stage some insights, 3rd stage poor
 - o Only surprise: Control engines in 1st stage
 - o Rest as predicted aluminum airframe, Scud technology, propellants
- Stage operation times, trajectories: Known with medium confidence
- Result: Consistent model of the rocket that duplicates the trajectory
- Scud-like engine in 2nd stage, high performance 3rd stage
- NTO/UDMH in 3rd stage likely
- Important findings:
 - o Perhaps more than 8,000 km range with 0.7 t ... **but**:
 - Low thrust 2nd and 3rd stage
 - o Only sensible for small satellites
 - O Higher thrust 2nd stage (Nodong engine) would offer >1,000 km more
 - o Designed as a satellite launcher
 - Bad production quality of first stage airframe, imported parts: Indications for prototyping, not serial production!

Consequences

- No change of previous assessments
- Long road to go for serious threat
- More of a political signal (domestic and external)
- Old program!
- NK: Demonstrate progress to NK people, world
- US, ROK, allies: Not important, remain vigilant
- Continue close observations

^{*} The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.